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1. Introduction 
 
There is growing interest in private toll road concessions in the United States following the well 
publicized transactions involving the Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road and speculation about 
possible multi-billion dollar deals involving other US toll roads.  
 
As a US concession model evolves, there is increasing scrutiny of the characteristics of European 
toll road private concessions.  Worrall (2006) in a discussion of the evolution of a US concession 
model notes that typical concession terms for European toll roads are a)  between 15 and 30 years 
(contrasted with 99 years for Skyway and 75 years for the Indiana Toll Road) and b) usually include 
renegotiation provisions.  
 
No detailed study has been undertaken so far, however, that examines the European experience 
compared with the recent US experience. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the 
literature.  In particular, this paper analyzes the main features of the Chicago Skyway and Indiana 
Toll Road concessions in the US and the Autoroutes du Sud de la France (ASF), Autoroutes Paris-
Rhin-Rhône (APRR) and Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de l’Est de la France (Sanef) 
concessions in France.  
 
All five of these toll road entities were  converted from public to private ownership in a span of 
eighteen months in early 2005 to mid 2006. In many respects, these roads and the processes 
(including the prospective investors) by which they were privatized are similar. There was a 
dramatic difference, however, in the valuation placed on the US vs. French toll roads;  the price 
paid by the investors for the French toll roads was twelve times current cash flow (earnings before 
interest, depreciation and amortization, or “EBITDA”) whereas investors paid sixty times current 
cash flow for the U.S. toll roads, as shown in Table 1.  
 
(Insert table 1 around here) 
 
In this paper we will explore two questions: What accounts for the difference in these multiples, and 
what are the implications with respect to the public interest? This paper does not address the merits 
of toll road concessions in general, but instead concentrates on the relative outcomes of the US and 
French approaches in terms of both price and social welfare. 
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Our analysis of the five US and French concessions allows us to arrive at several conclusions that 
are useful in evaluating the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road concessions with respect to 
the public interest. For example, we compute what part of the price paid for the Chicago Skyway 
concession comes from anticipated toll increases. In addition, we compute what part of the 
concession price comes from efficiency/productivity gains not shared with the users of the Skyway 
as is the case in the French concessions.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the two concession approaches. In 
Section III we analyze the bidding parameters in both approaches. In Section IV we study the 
spread of bids observed in the US and France. In Section V, we look at the relative changes in 
social welfare that result from the US and French approaches. Finally, we draw the main 
conclusions from our analysis. 
 
 
2. Description of the Two Concession Approaches 
 
Before looking at the particular concession approaches used recently in France and the US, it is 
useful to review the history of modern toll roads in Europe and the US. This review suggests, 
among other things, that the the risks inherent in operating toll roads in the Europe and the United 
States are not so different as to be a contributing factor in the difference in prices.  
 
2.1. Toll Roads in Europe 
 
After World War II European economies grew rapidly and by the 1960s many European countries 
were developing plans for networks of motorways. Countries in Northern and Central Europe, as 
well as the United Kingdom chose to finance new motorways from their general funds. The 
Southern European countries opted for toll financing since funds from the general budget to finance 
motorways were scarcer (Bel, 1999), as well as in recognition of the fact that much of the new road 
infrastructure would be used by non-resident visitors , for example tourists (Gomez-Ibañez and 
Meyer, 1993). In the case of France and Italy in the 1950’s and 1960’s, concessions were given to 
state-owned companies and agencies which were responsible for building and operating the roads. 
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In Spain, private firms were granted concessions to build and operate the toll motorways.1 This 
pattern of tax-financed motorways in Northern Europe  and toll-financed motorways in Southern 
Europe persists to this day as shown in Table 2.   
 
(Insert table 2 around here) 
 
As mentioned previously, Spain traditionally had been disposed to privately owned and managed 
toll concessions. Many of the other countries with toll roads have made a transition  from publicly-
owned to privately-owned toll concessions.  For example, most of the Italian toll motorway network 
(Autostrade, now 2,118 miles) was privatized in 1999 through a public offering of shares that were 
subject to competitive bidding, and most of the French network was privatized in 2006. Only in 
Greece are the toll motorways managed by a public agency (the Greek National Road Fund).2 
 
Financial motivations have been the primary reason for privatizing motorway concessions in 
Europe over the last decade.3 In France, the Prime Minister announced in June 2005 that, “I have 
decided to pursue the sale of the state-owned shares in the motorway  companies as a means to 
finance the large public works. The revenues obtained from these sales will go mainly to the 
Agency for the Finance of Transport Infrastructures, so that it can speed up [its investment 
program]”.4 In September 2005, the Government stressed that the main objective being pursued 
with the privatization of the state-owned concession companies was “to obtain financial revenues 
that will allow to pay a part of the National Debt and to finance new essential infrastructures.”5  
                                                 
1 In France, these concessions included strict contractual limits linked to a CPI index. Later, in the early 
1970s, some concessions were awarded to private firms, as discussed belowe. In other Southern countries, 
such as Portugal and Greece, plans to develop the motorway network were not undertaken until much later. 
More recently, Ireland has begun to rely on private concessions to extend its tollway network. 
2 Although the Greek toll roads are managed currently by public agencies, there is an expectation that there 
will be private concessions. Public management of tolls is also important in Norway (non-EU country), were 
almost 90 per cent of the motorways network is tolled, and all tolls are publicly managed.  
3 In Italy, the government launched a wide privatization program in 1997 because of the financial restrictions 
imposed by the Maastricht Treaty conditions (Baldassarri, Macchiati and Piacentino, 1997). As a part of this 
program, Autostrade was transferred to the private sector in 1999. Autostrade’s concession was scheduled to 
expire in 2003. In order to maximize privatization receipts the concession was extended until 2038 and the 
level of tolls was maintained (and further adjusted for inflation), although most of the investments had been 
amortized before 1999 (Greco and Ragazzi, 2005). 
4 Portail du Government, Déclaration de politique générale: le programme du Gouvernment. 8 June 2005. By 
early 2005 it had been created the Agence de financement des infrastructures de transport de France 
(AFITF). One of the expected sources of revenues to fund this Agency was the benefits obtained by the 
French State and the public company Autoroutes de France as a result of their shareholding in the concessions 
of tolled motorways (Press release after de French Conseil des Ministres of 26 January 2005).  
5 Portail du Government, La privatisation des sociétes concessionaries d’autoroutes. Questions & Réponses, 
n. 020, 7 September 2005.  
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2.2. The French Toll Road System 
 
Prime Minister Villepin’s  2005 pronouncement was made against the backdrop of a tradition in 
France where public and private ownership of toll roads both have been present. Between the 
middle 1950s and the late 1960s, toll road concessions were awarded to state-owned firms and to 
mixed public-private companies in which the public sector had a majority stake. Between 1955 and 
1963 five mixed companies were created, which were called “sociétés d’économie mixte 
concessionnaries d’autoroutes”, or SEMCAs (Fayard, Gaeta and Quinet, 2005). Throughout the 
1960s the SEMCAs were little more than “paper organizations” (Fayard, Gaeta and Quinet, 2005), 
with no substantive role in the management of concessions. In the late 1960’s, reforms were 
implemented in order to give the SEMCAs more autonomy and responsibility. These reforms 
allowed private companies to own motorway concessions. Between 1970 and 1973 four private 
companies obtained toll road concessions.  
 
In the early 1980’s the French motorway system faced serious financial problems due in part to an  
increase in gas prices and an  economic downturn that retarded the growth of traffic. In 1982, the 
French government  took over three of the four private concessions and a new government agency, 
Autoroutes de France (ADF)  was established. This change  allowed the government to  cross-
subsidize various toll roads. 
 
Extension of the motorway network intensified through the 1990s and a restructuring of the 
ownership of toll roads was undertaken in order to modernize the concession system and to 
stimulate toll road investment. In order to promote financial viability, the SEMCAs were 
consolidated into three main groups based on geography. These groups were Autoroutes du Sud de 
la France (ASF), Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhône (APRR) and Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de 
l’Est de la France (Sanef). These are the toll roads that were privatized in 2006 and are the subject 
of this paper. 
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2.2.1. Autoroutes du Sud de la France (ASF) 
 
ASF was formed in 1957 to operate the Lyon-Orange motorway. ASF’s network gradually 
developed in southeast and southwest France. In 1994 ASF took over ESCOTA, the company 
operating the Estérel, Côte d’Azur, Provence and Alps autoroutes. The ESCOTA concession was to 
expire on 31 December 2026, and the original ASF concession was to expire on 31 December 2032. 
 
By mid-2006, the length of the road  concession network operated by ASF was 1,842 miles which 
made ASF the largest highway concessionaire in France and the second largest in Europe. The 
network connects France, Italy and Spain and services the French cities of Lyon, Marseille, 
Bordeaux, Toulouse and Nice. Three out of the four busiest motorways in France are in the ASF 
network: Autoroutes A7, A8 and A9. Table 3 presents financial and corporate information on ASF 
before privatization. 
 
(Insert table 3 around here) 
 
2.2.2. Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhône (APRR) 
 
APRR was formed in 1961 to operate the Paris-Lyon motorway A6. APRR’s network expanded 
over time, with the addition of the A5 and A39 motorways that provided alternative routes to 
France’s eastern regions (Toul and Mulhouse) and central regions (Bourges and Clermont-Ferrand). 
In 1994 when the French motorway sector was being restructured, APRR took over Autoroutes 
Rhône-Alpes (AREA).  The APRR and AREA concessions were to expire on 31 December 2032.  
 
By mid-2006, the length of the road network operated by APRR was 1,371 miles. This made APRR 
the second largest highway concessionaire in France and the fourth largest in Europe. The 
operations of this group are concentrated at central France. The group’s road network mainly covers 
the Paris-Lyon (A5, A6, A39) motorway, the  Bourgogne-Northern Europe (A31-A36) motorway, 
the Alpine motorways in the Rhone-Alps region (A40, A41, A42, A43, A48) and the motorways in 
the center  of France (A77, A71).  Table 3 presents financial and corporate information on APRR 
before privatization. 
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2.2.3. Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de l’Est de la France (Sanef) 
 
Sanef was formed in 1963 to operate the Paris-Lille motorway (A1). Sanef’s network expanded 
over time; the main extensions were a new concession connecting Belgium with the north and east 
of France (A2), and the takeover of the Paris-Metz motorway (A4). In 1994, Sanef assumed 
ownership of the Société des Autoroutes Paris-Normandie (SAPN) that operates a network serving 
the western Ile-de- France and Normandie. The Sanef and SAPN concessions were to expire on 31 
December 2028.  
 
By mid-2006, the length of the road concession network operated by Sanef was 1,083 miles. This 
made Sanef the third largest highway concessionaire in France and the fifth largest in Europe. The 
operations of this group are concentrated at the northern part of France. Sanef includes the 
‘autoroute du Nord’, the most heavily used French motorway. Table 3 presents financial and 
corporate information on Sanef before privatization. 
 
2.3. Toll Roads in the United States 
 
Most of the interstate highway system in the United Sates was planned and built as part of the 
Interstate Highway System under the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956. Today 
the Interstate System includes approximately 47,000 miles of roads representing an investment of 
$329 billion in 1996 dollars. In addition, there are approximately 21,000 miles of other non-
Interstate roads that are limited access, divided highways. Eight percent, or 5,300 miles, of the total 
of 68,000 miles of limited access roads in the United States are tolled (Cox and Love, 1996).  
 
Most of the roads that constitute the Interstate Highway System are non-tolled roads that were built 
and are maintained by gasoline taxes collected by state governments and the Federal government. 
There are, however, approximately 3,000 miles of toll roads that are also a part of the Interstate 
System that were financed and built by state and municipal governments and agencies. Examples 
include the Pennsylvania Turnpike, New Jersey Turnpike, Indiana Toll Road and the Chicago 
Skyway. There are only a very small number of toll roads in the US that have been developed, 
owned or operated by the private sector in the last hundred years. 
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Over the last several years there has been a movement in the US toward public-private partnerships 
in the transportation sector. The impetus behind this movement is the belief that the private sector 
can bring much needed capital and expertise to address the US growing transport infrastructure 
needs. One area in which the private sector has shown particular interest is existing toll roads, given 
what many believe are their attractive investment characteristics. This interest has been matched by 
the desire of some states and municipalities to monetize the future earnings of these toll roads to 
fund various operating and capital projects. The first two of these “monetizations” in the US were 
the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road. 
 
2.3.1. The Chicago Skyway 
 
The Chicago Skyway was financed and constructed by the City of Chicago in the mid-1950’s and 
was opened for traffic in 1958. The Skyway is a 7.8 mile long road and bridge facility that connects 
the western end of the Indiana Toll Road with the Dan Ryan Expressway (a non-tolled road) that 
provides access to downtown Chicago.  
 
In March 2004, the City issued a Request of Concessionaire Qualifications as the initial step in 
leasing the Skyway to a private operator. The City’s motivation was to raise cash (in the form of an 
upfront concession rent) to be used by the City to fund various municipal needs and, in the process, 
to eliminate a non-core municipal operation. Bids from qualified bidders were received by the City 
in October, 2004 and a consortium comprised of Macquarie Investment Holdings and Cintra 
Concessiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte S.A. was declared the winning bidder. The 
concession transaction was completed in January 2005. Table 4 presents financial and corporate 
information on Chicago Skyway before privatization. 
 
(Insert table 4 around here) 
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2.3.2. The Indiana Toll Road 
 
The Indiana Toll Road was financed and constructed by the State of Indiana during the 1950’s and 
was opened for traffic in 1956. It is 157 miles in length and runs across the northern part of Indiana 
from the Illinois to the Ohio border. The Indiana Toll Road Commission was responsible for 
operating the road during the period 1956 to 1981 when management passed to the Indiana 
Department of Transportation.  
 
In September of 2005 the State of Indiana issued a Request for Toll Road Concessionaire Proposals. 
The motivation of the State for taking this action was to generate an upfront concession rent that 
could be used to partially fund a ten year statewide transportation improvement program. After a 
qualification process, five groups were invited to bid on the concession. Four bids were received by 
the State in January, 2006, and Statewide Mobility Partners (a consortium consisting of Macquarie 
Infrastructure Group and Cintra Concessiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte S.A.) was declared 
the winning bidder. In June 2006, the concession transaction was completed with full operating 
responsibility for the Toll Road being transferred to the concessionaire. Table 4 presents financial 
and corporate information on Indiana Toll Road before privatization. 
 
2.4. The Privatization Process 
 
In the five subject toll roads, the privatizations were set up as leases in which the concessionaire has 
the obligation to operate the road pursuant to an agreement with the public owner in return for the 
right to collect tolls on the road. Title to the road does not change hands. Also in both the French 
and US cases, prospective concessionaires were invited to bid pursuant to a sealed bid process.  
 
The three French concessions were auctioned separately, but at the same time. The process used 
was indicative bids were invited by the French government, followed by firm bids. The French 
government then met with the bidders to review the respective offers. Upon review, the French 
government declared a winner for each of the three concessions. The bidding process for Skyway 
and the Indiana Toll Road also involved a prequalification stage and then an invitation to bid. The 
highest bidder was declared the winner. The particular steps and timeline for the French and US 
concessions are  included in table A-1 in the appendix. 
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The processes followed in the two countries were very similar (see table A-1 in appendix) with one 
important exception; as a bidding requirement, offers for the French concessions had to be 
accompanied by two pieces of supporting documentation: a business plan and an “industrial” plan. 
The business plan detailed the assumptions for traffic, revenues, maintenance and capital 
expenditures, financing structure and expenditures. The industrial plan detailed the strategic, 
management and operational initiatives to be implemented by the concessionaires and commitments 
regarding labor issues and the relationship with regional and local authorities, and community 
interest groups.  
 
These plans were subject to review and comment by the French government and evaluated as an 
integral element of the bids. The consequence of this for the French concessions was that  price was 
not the sole  bid award criterion  as it was for the U.S. concessions. As will be discussed in more 
detail, this “best bid”, as opposed to “high bid”, approach used for the French concessions had the 
dual consequence of a) lowering the amount of the winning bid, and b) narrowing the spread among 
bids. 
 
 
3. Analysis of Bidding Parameters 
 
The underlying basis of the economic value of a toll road concession, regardless of venue, is the 
projected annual cash flow generated by the road over the concession period. (The cash flow in a 
particular year is equal to the gross toll revenue minus operating costs and capital expenditures.) 
The inputs used to develop the projected cash flows are: (1) The term of the concession; (2) A 
projection of gross toll revenue which is a function of future traffic and future tolls; (3) Operating 
costs; and (4) Capital expenditures. 
 
To determine the price an investor would be willing to pay for this cash flow, we need to discount 
the cash flow over the term of the concession. The appropriate discount rate is the weighted cost of 
capital used by the concessionaire to finance the concession payment, or rent. 
 
In both the French and U.S. cases, each bidder was provided certain bid parameters; the term of the 
concession, the toll regulation (for example, the formula by which tolls can be adjusted annually), 
and the minimum capital investments to be made over the term of the concession. The Chicago and 
Indiana concession agreements, in addition to setting forth operating and legal requirements, 
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established minimum standards for the physical upkeep of the roads. It was left to each bidder, 
however, to determine the level of investment to maintain these standards. This is contrasted with 
the French concessions where the actual investments are monitored by the government. 
 
The bidders, armed with the bidding parameters, were then in a position to construct financial 
models of the toll roads’ future cash flows. These models require making assumptions about  (a) the 
relevant economic indices (for example CPI, GDP) that form the basis of the toll setting formula; 
(b) traffic (for example, usage) growth that reflects the elasticity of demand as a function of 
increases in tolls, among other factors; (c) operating costs (reflecting usage, efficiencies and 
inflation; and (d) capital expenditures.  
 
To understand the differences in the multiples paid for the US and French concessions it is useful 
to determine the sensitivity of the discounted cash flows to each of the bid parameters and 
assumptions. To do this, we have used the Chicago Skyway as the example.6 The parameters and 
assumptions used by the winning bidder to arrive at the $1.83 billion concession price for Skyway 
were: Concession term (99 years); toll increases (stated increases through 2017 and 3.6% per 
annum thereafter); compound annual growth in traffic (1.23%); and annual net growth in operating 
expenses (3.45%). 
 
These parameters and assumptions constitute the base case (Case 1) in Table 5. Cases 2, 3, 4, and 5 
each show a change in a single variable to illustrate the effect of each variable on the size of the 
concession price. 
 
(Insert table 5 around here) 
 
Changes in the length of the concession term (Case 2), toll rates (Case 3) and growth in traffic 
(Case 4) have a significant impact on the discounted value of the resulting cash flows. Case 5 
indicates that the discounted value is less insensitive to operating (and capital) costs. With respect to 
the relative importance of these variables on the discounted value, Enright (2006) found that the toll 
schedule was the primary driver in establishing the value of the Skyway concession.  
 
                                                 
6 The reason for choosing the Skyway is that we have access to the assumptions made by the winning bidder 
through the Preliminary Offering Memorandum dated July 28, 2005 for bonds issued by the Skyway 
Concession Company LLC. These bonds refinanced the bank loans used to fund the upfront concession 
payment. 
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Case 6 shows the effect of shortening the length of the concession term and moderating the annual 
increases in the toll rate,  both consistent with the French concession agreements, and moderating 
the assumed growth in traffic. (With respect to the last, see text associated with Table 10.) The 
resulting discounted value, expressed as a multiple of EBITDA, is close to the multiples of the 
French concessions (15 vs. 12). In other words, if the French concession parameters with respect to 
term and toll regulation were applied to the Skyway, the concession price for the Skyway, 
expressed as a multiple of EBITDA, would have been similar to the prices paid for the French 
concessions. 
 
There were certain other parameters included in the French concession documents that were absent 
in the US concession agreements. These parameters do not affect the projected cash flows, but 
impact the cost of capital and therefore the discount rate, which in turn affects price. One of these 
parameters was an upper bound placed by the French government on the amount of leverage the 
concessionaire could use to finance the concession payment. The French government mandated that 
the concessionaire comply with two leverage ratios;  Net Debt/EBITDA≤ 7.0, and 
EBITDA/Financial charges> 2.2. These constraints have the effect of increasing the amount of 
equity relative to debt the concessionaire must use to finance the concession rent. Given equity has 
a higher cost than debt, the overall (weighted) cost of capital will be higher. The consequence of a 
higher cost of capital, all other things being equal, is a higher discount rate that results in a lower 
valuation.  
 
To illustrate the magnitude of the effect of the cost of capital on valuation, we can apply one of the 
leverage constraints imposed by the French government to the Skyway transaction. This constraint 
is Net Debt/EBITDA≤ 7.0. Immediately following the  refinancing of the Skyway concession 
(approximately six months after the closing of the original transaction), the ratio of net debt to 
EBITDA was 35 ($1.4 billion divided by $40 million). Reducing the amount of debt (by increasing 
the amount of invested equity) in order to be in compliance with the French leverage ratio would 
have caused the Skyway’s concessionaire’s cost of capital to increase by approximately 2.3 
percentage points, as illustrated in Table 6. The impact of this increase on the Skyway valuation 
using the Case 1 and Case 6 assumptions (see Table 5) is shown below. The concession price in 
Case 6a, expressed as a multiple of EBITDA, is virtually the same as the multiples realized for the 
French concessions as shown in Table 1. 
 
(Insert table 6 around here) 
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To summarize, the lower price-earnings multiples observed in the French concessions are due in 
large part to the shorter terms of the concessions and the more moderate toll increases allowed 
under the French concession agreements, as well as the less aggressive assumptions regarding 
growth in traffic. Further, the more conservative capital structure imposed by the French 
Government has the effect of lowering the price a concessionaire is willing to pay.  
 
 
4. Analysis of the Spread of Bids Observed in the Two Approaches 
 
Not only were the prices paid for the French concessions significantly lower (on a price-earnings 
basis) than the prices for the U.S. concessions, but also the spread of the bids received for each of 
the French roads was much narrower than the bids received for the US roads. One fact that makes 
this outcome particularly interesting is that there was significant overlap among the bidders for the 
French concessions and the US concessions as shown in table 7. 
 
(Insert table 7 around here) 
 
To explain the large variation in the bids for the US concessions, one needs to look at the key 
assumptions that the bidders made in order to construct their respective valuation models. These 
assumptions are: (a) Traffic growth; (b) Toll schedule (c)  Operating costs; (d) Discount Rate.7 It is 
reasonable to conclude by observing the very small spread between the winning and second place 
bids in the French auctions that the assumptions used by the bidders were similar. Conversely, the 
large spreads in the US auctions were likely caused by disparate assumptions.  
 
There are several reasons why there were different distributions of assumptions in the French vs. the 
U.S. concessions. First with respect tolls, the toll setting formula for the French concessions is 
based on a fixed percentage (70%) of CPI after an initial period of years during which the actual 
tolls were established by the French government. Given the fact that the European Central Bank has 
an established policy of maintaining CPI at 2%, there is very little opportunity for the bidders to 
have different projections of the tolls that can be charged.  
                                                 
7 As discussed previously, the appropriate discount rate is the weighted cost of capital that is used to finance 
concession price. In the absence of leverage constraints, this cost of capital is a function of the bidders’ 
perception of the risk of the project; the higher the risk, the higher the cost of capital. This assumes that all of 
the bidders have essentially the same access to the capital markets. 
13
XREAP2007-11 
 
 
 
In both Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road, tolls can be adjusted annually by the greater of 2%, 
change in CPI or change in nominal GDP per capita. Further, there is significantly more volatility in 
the US indices as shown in the graph 1, below. A likely consequence of the resulting uncertainly is 
widely divergent views on the part of bidders with regard to the future levels of these indices and, in 
turn, the projection of toll rates.  
 
(Insert graph 1 around here) 
 
With respect to traffic projections, the bidders had access to historic and projected traffic data 
prepared by or for the public owner. It was at the discretion of each of the bidders to adopt the 
projections or to prepare revised projections. In the case of the Skyway it is known that the winning 
bidder commissioned its own traffic study that projected  dramatically higher usage of the road, as 
shown in table 8. 
 
(Insert table 8 around here) 
 
Using Skyway again as an illustration, the winning and second place  bids were $1.83 billion and 
$700 million, respectively. The $1.1 billion difference can be explained by the winning bidder using 
more aggressive traffic projections, higher toll rates or a lower cost of capital, or a combination of 
these. 
 
Although we do not have inside information about the assumptions that underpin the respective 
bidders’ valuation of the concessions or the rationale used by each bidder to make their 
assumptions, there are two plausible and complimentary explanations for the winning bidder of the 
US concessions to be an outlier. The first of these theories is the Winner’s Curse,8 which observes 
there is a tendency for one or more bidders in an auction to overestimate the value of the asset being 
auctioned. The Winner’s Curse suggests that there are a number of possible reasons for this 
overestimation—both conscious and unconscious, rational and irrational.  
 
The second possible explanation is that in a market that is the early stages of privatization, bidders 
are willing to make abnormally high bids in order to achieve a leading position for subsequent 
                                                 
8 The concept of the Winner’s Course was first discussed in Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971). Thaler 
(1988) contains a useful explanation of this concept and its applications. 
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privatizations (Miralles, 2006). Certainly, the privatization markets in France and the US are in very 
different stages. Private tollways in France are well-established and represent a mature investment 
opportunity. In fact, no significant privatizations are expected in the foreseeable future. In contrast, 
privatization of toll roads is an emerging market in the US, and most industry observers expect that 
there will be significant privatization activity over the next several years. Skyway and the Indiana 
Toll Road have played the role of ‘opening’ the US market, and winning these concessions has 
given Macquaire and Cintra visibility, and positioned them as leading firms in this new area.9 
 
In addition to the different nature of the two markets, there is a procedural reason why the bidders 
for the French concessions were not as susceptible to the Winner’s Curse (or at least to the same 
degree as the bidders for the US concessions). In the French process there is the requirement for the 
bidders to disclose their assumptions to the government as part of the bidding process. We expect if 
bidders know that the referee of the auction will review and evaluate the reasonableness of the 
financial and operating models as part of its decision-making process, bidders will be more 
circumspect with respect their assumptions and less prone to overestimation.  
 
There is an additional observation that can be made about respective outcomes of the French and 
US privatization approaches. The Skyway and Indiana concessions were structured to maximize the 
concession price. This was done by establishing the bid parameters with the objective of generating 
the highest possible discounted cash flow and by deciding the auction only on the basis of price. 
With respect to the latter, this “high bid” protocol provides the opportunity for the Winner’s Curse 
phenomenon to play out with the consequence of a possible over-valuation. The French approach, 
on the other hand, is not structured to  maximize the concession price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Even if Macquarie and Cintra “over paid” for these concessions, their downside risk, from a corporate 
perspective, is minimal. This is due  to the relatively small size of the deals and the fact that in the case of 
Skyway, they were able to structure the financing so that it shifted much of the financial risk of the enterprise 
to the lenders through the use of leverage, bond insurance, and liberal dividend provisions. 
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5. Impact on Social Welfare of the US Approach as compared with the French approach. 
 
The above discussion leads to the obvious question of why the French government would structure 
its concession process and agreements in such a way as to not maximize the concession price, or in 
other words, to leave money on the table. The answer to this question lies in the concept of the 
“public interest” which, for the purposes of this paper, we define as being equivalent to the 
economist’s concept of social welfare.  Social welfare includes the welfare of all agents involved in 
or affected by a policy or situation; consumers (users), producers, workers, and taxpayers. There is 
a fifth party if the policy has relevant external effects (for instance congestion, pollution, etc.). This 
social welfare concept can be expressed by the following function: 
 
PI≈ SW = CS + β PS + γ WS + δ TS + EE , 
 
where SW stands for Social Welfare, CS stands for Consumers’ Surplus, PS stands for Producer 
Surplus, WS stands for Workers’ Surplus, TS stands for Taxpayers’ Surplus,10 and EE stands for 
External Effects.  α, β, γ, and δ are  the different weights given to the welfare of each of these 
groups. When policymakers make decisions with redistributive implications, they are implicitly 
weighting each of the categories. If one does not want to consider distributional considerations, we 
can assume that α = β = γ = δ. In this way, transfers between groups do not change aggregated 
social welfare. It is worth noting that even in this trivial case transfers tell interesting stories about 
winners and losers.  
 
With respect to toll road concessions, the following social welfare relationships hold:  
 
• If lengthening the concession period results in a higher concession price, then local 
taxpayer surplus increases. 
                                                 
10 The definitions of the various surpluses are:  
- Consumers’ surplus is the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for a good and the actual 
price of the good. 
- Producer surplus is the difference between what a producer obtains from selling a good and the cost 
involved in producing it. 
- Workers’ surplus is the difference between what workers receive from working and the wage that workers 
would be willing to accept in order to keep the job. 
- Taxpayers’ surplus is the difference between the utility derived from public services and the costs implied 
by taxation to pay for the services. 
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• Higher tolls paid by consumers results in extra profits for the producer -the concessionaire-, 
and this, in turn, increases taxpayer surplus because of the resulting higher concession price 
Merely transferring cash from consumers to taxpayers does not increase overall social  
 
1.welfare. In the cases of the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road it is clear that the city and 
state, respectively, gave more importance to taxpayers’ welfare than to consumers’ welfare. It is 
easy to explain how this occurred given the fact that all local taxpayers are voters in local elections 
(regional taxpayers are voters in regional election), whereas only a fraction of Skyway users vote in 
Chicago, and many users of the Indiana Toll Road are from out of state.   
 
Using this framework, we can identify some tangible measures to contrast the two approaches.  
From the perspective of the public owner (e.g. the French Government, the City of Chicago, the 
State of Indiana) and with respect to taxpayers’ surplus: 
 
a) A larger vs. smaller concession price is better, regardless of the use of the sale proceeds.  
b)  A large concession price that is financially unsustainable (‘the deal goes “south”’) may or 
may not be a bad thing depending on the “take back” provisions. 
c)  A shorter concession term vs. a longer concession term may or may not be better depending 
on how the public owner assesses risks of ownership (e.g. the contingent liabilities of on-going 
maintenance, bond payments) vs. the value of future operational flexibility. 
 
The much higher prices paid for the Skyway and Indiana Toll Road concessions result in the 
taxpayers in Chicago and Indiana being winners, as contrasted with the French concessions and 
taxpayers.11  
 
With respect to consumers’ (toll payers’) surplus: (a) Lower tolls vs. higher tolls are better (b) 
Better maintained and operated (efficient, safe, service-oriented) roads are good. 
 
                                                 
11 Theoretically, this taxpayer “windfall” is not a risk even if the price is not financially sustainable, 
but practically there are likely to be costs borne by the taxpayers in the case of a default by the 
concessionaire. Also, there is a situation in which a higher price and greater leverage could have a 
long-term detrimental effect on taxpayers; in the case of the Skyway, the City can terminate the 
concession early, but only upon payment to concessionaire of the fair market value of the 
concession but not less than the value of the debt outstanding. To the extent that concessionaire 
keeps the asset fully leveraged, this termination option will be expensive for taxpayers. 
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The most striking difference between the French and the US approaches relates to the toll setting 
formulas to be followed by the concessionaires over the term of the concessions. It is worth 
recalling that toll increases in the French concessions are limited to 70% of CPI after an initial 
period when tolls increases are pre-agreed. The toll setting formulas for the Skyway and Indiana 
Toll Road also have pre-established tolls for an initial period and then allow tolls to increase 
annually by the greater of 2%, change in CPI, or change in nominal GDP per capita.  
 
The following graphs compare the actual toll schedule versus the CPI in the case of the Sanef 
concessions (Sanef and SAPN), and the Chicago Skyway and the ITR concessions. To make 
comparisons possible these graphs show toll rates only until 2028, which is the year when the Sanef 
concessions end.  
(Insert graph 2 around here) 
 (Insert graph 3 around here) 
(Insert graph 4 around  here) 
(Insert graph 5 around here) 
 
From the graphs it is readily seen that the projected toll increases for the Sanef concession are 
smaller than the change in CPI. After 2009, when the 70% of CPI formula becomes applicable, 
there is a continuous decrease of tolls in real terms (adjusted for inflation). At the end of the 
concession, tolls have decreased by more than 10% in real terms. As a consequence, toll road users 
have won purchasing power (or an increase in consumers’ surplus). In the case of the SAPN 
concession, real tolls exhibit a similar pattern, although it takes longer for consumers to win 
purchasing power, since the real decrease of tolls begins in 2014.  
 
This situation is very different in the cases of Skyway and ITR. Graph 4 shows that actual tolls on 
the Skyway increase faster than CPI because of the pre-agreed increases. After 2017, when the pre-
established toll schedule ends, the real increase of tolls continues because of the nominal GDP per 
capita factor of the formula.12 Graph 5 tells a similar story for the Indiana Toll Road. 
 
Finally, Graph 6 shows the toll schedule throughout the full term (99 years) of the Chicago Skyway 
concession. The difference between the increase in tolls, based on the projection of the 
                                                 
12 History of macroeconomic indicators in the US shows that increases of CPI are lower than 
changes of nominal GDP/capita. Table A-2 in the appendix displays the recent history of CPI and 
nominal GDP/capita in the US in the 10 years before Chicago Skyway was privatized. 
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concessionaire and the increase that would result from using only CPI in the toll formula is 
significant. By the end of the concession term real tolls have more than doubled, assuming an 
average annual increase in CPI of 3%, and more than tripled assuming an annual average increase 
of 3.5%. 
(Insert graph 6 here) 
 
As previously observed, the concession model used by the City of Chicago and the Indiana Toll 
Road resulted in maximizing the concession price at the expense of consumers’ surplus.  In order to 
quantify the effect on consumers, we calculated the concession price for Skyway using the “French” 
toll regulation of 70% of CPI, while maintaining all of the Skyway concessionaire’s other 
assumptions, for example 99 year term, Halcrow traffic projections. (See Case 3 in Table 5.)  The 
total price paid would have been US$1.088 billion (or US$742 million less than the actual 
concession price). Alternatively, if we calculated the price using toll increases tied to 100% of CPI, 
the concession rent would have been US$1.330 billion (or US$500 million less than the actual 
concession price). 
 
The US$742 million difference between the actual concession price and the hypothetical concession 
price resulting from the 70% of CPI toll regulation is made up of two pieces:  
 
(a) US$500 million of lost of purchasing power for consumers (the effect of the difference 
between greater than CPI increases and increases limited to CPI);  and 
(b) US$242 million of opportunity cost resulting from consumers not sharing in the 
productivity/efficiency gains (the difference of tolls beginning indexed to 100% of CPI versus 
70% of CPI). 
 
Hence, consumers are losers in the Skyway (and Indiana) concessions, relative to consumers in 
France; the Skyway users not only lose purchasing power because tolls increase faster than CPI, but 
also do not share efficiency/productivity gains as is the case with the French concessions. 
 
From the perspective of the region (the locale served by the road) and with respect to external 
effects: 
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(a) Pricing strategies (for example, toll setting, variable pricing, etc.) that optimize regional 
mobility (measured either in terms of aggregate traffic moved and/or in terms of level of 
regional congestion) are good. 
(b) Tolls that reflect externalities and compensate the parties that pay for these externalities are 
good. 
 
Both the Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road have strong monopolistic characteristics which give the 
concessionaires significant latitude to set tolls so as to maximize profits.  There is no motivation for 
these concessionaires to set tolls to optimize regional mobility or to internalize external effects 
unless these activities enhance their bottom line. As a consequence, residents in the regions served 
by the road are likely losers from this concessions approach.13  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes the large difference in the prices paid by investors for US concessions relative 
to the prices paid for French concessions using the Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road in the 
US and Sanef, APRR and ASF in France as the sample. The significantly higher price-earnings 
multiples paid for the US concessions can be explained by two primary factors; structural 
differences between the US and French concessions, and procedural differences in the processes 
used by the City of Chicago and the State of Indiana and the French government to privatize their 
respective toll roads. 
 
With respect to the structure of the concessions, both Skyway’s and the Indiana Toll Road’s longer 
lease terms, higher allowable toll rates and absence of capitalization restriction are major drivers of 
the higher prices paid by investors for those roads.  
 
The procedural difference that had a significant impact on price was the auction award criteria. In 
the US concessions, “high bid wins” was the  sole award criterion, The biding protocol gives the 
bidders the ability to make financial modeling assumptions that are not transparent to the public 
owner (and therefore not subject to review and evaluation). The lack of visibility into the bidding 
                                                 
13 It is worthwhile noting that traffic conditions in the corridor make this problem more important in the case 
of the Chicago Skyway concession than in the ITR concession. 
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assumptions presents the opportunity for some bidders to overestimate the value of the concession, 
as is evidenced by the wide spread between the winning and second place bids in the US auctions. 
 
Table 9 summarizes these structural and procedural drivers illustrating in a step-wise fashion how 
the Skyway concession price would converge to the French concession prices if the structural and 
procedural differences are removed.  
 
(Insert table 9 around here) 
 
The City of Chicago and the State of Indiana maximized the concession prices each received 
through the way they organized their respective bid process and the concession structure.  In 
contrast, the French transactions were organized not with the objective (or the result) of maximizing 
the concession prices. Instead the French concessions were structured to balance consumer welfare 
and taxpayer welfare.      
 
Certainly the much higher prices paid for the US concessions result in taxpayers being winners 
when compared to taxpayers in the French approach. This gain, however, is at the expense of the 
consumers, the toll payers. According to our calculations, the Skyway users (and the Indiana Toll 
Road users) not only lose purchasing power because tolls increase faster than CPI, but also do not 
share efficiency/productivity gains one might expect from placing the public toll roads under 
private control.  
 
The higher prices paid for the US concessions also has the effect of placing more financial pressure 
on the concessionaire to maximize the net income that can be generated, not only to service debt, 
but also provide a satisfactory return to the equity investors. Although it is speculative at this point 
to identify the actual consequences of this, it is reasonable to expect that the Skyway and Indiana 
Toll Road concessionaires will operate their roads with the singular focus of maximizing profit, 
regardless of any external objectives or costs.  
 
The recent transactions in the US and France illustrate how structural and procedural decisions 
made by the public owner affect the concession price. There is no intrinsic value that can be 
assigned to a particular toll road; the value, or more accurately the price, is largely a function of the 
characteristics of the concession and not the road itself.  Further, the terms of the concession have 
direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.  
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Concessions can serve the public interest, but the decisions about how a concession is to be 
organized, both structurally and procedurally, should be made explicit and the tradeoffs inherent 
in these decisions made part of the public debate. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Comparison of prices paid for toll road concessions in France and the U.S. 
(US$million(1)) 
   APRR Sanef   ASF  Skyway 
 Indiana 
Toll Road 
                     Year 2005 2005 2005  2004 2005 
Gross Revenues 1,854 1,359 2,919 41 99
EBITDA 1,149 873 1,853 29 64
Concession Price (2) 14,122 10,645 23,161 1,830 3,850
Price as Multiple of EBITDA 12.3x 12.2x 12.5x 63.1x 60.2x
Percent Difference Between 
High and Second Bid 
 
1.6%     1.7%
 
n.a.(3)
  
161.4%    26.2%
            
(1) Using an exchange rate of $1.18 to 1 Euro.      
(2) In the case of the French toll concessions, price includes assumed debt.  
(3) There was only one bidder for the ASF concession. 
Source: Author’s 
 
 
Table 2. Motorway network and toll motorways at the beginning of 2004 in the EU-15 (miles) 
        Motorway Network           Toll Motorways                             % 
Greece 569 569 100% 
Italy 4,250 3,476 82% 
Portugal 1,411 1,100 78% 
France 6,452 4,872 76% 
Spain 6,524 1,622 25% 
Finland 375 43 11% 
Austria 1,243 87 7% 
Denmark 605 21 3% 
Sweden 901 10 1% 
United Kingdom 2,160 27 1% 
Belgium 1,074 1 0% 
Germany 7,456 2 0% 
Ireland 176 0 0% 
Luxembourg 81 0 0% 
Netherlands 1,429 0 0% 
Total 34,706 11,830 34% 
 
Notes: Toll motorways for non-commercial vehicles. The tolled facility in Germany is the Rostock 
Tunnel. The tolled facility in Belgium is the Liefkenshoek tunnel. The amount of 140 kms 
of tolled motorways in Austria is approximate. 
Source: Motorway network from Fayard (2005). General information on toll motorways from 
ASECAP web page. Information on Ireland obtained from the National Roads Authority. 
Information on Austria obtained from Autobahnen-und Schnellstrassen-Finanzierungs 
Aktiengesellschaft (ASFINAG). 
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Table 3: Financial and Corporate pre-privatization information on APRR, Sanef & ASF (end 
of 2005) 
 APRR SANEF ASF 
Established in 1961 1963 1957 
Network length (miles as of  
June 2006) 
1,370 1,083 1,841 
First listed on the Paris Stock 
Exchange 
25 November 2004 24 March 2005 28 March 2002 
Initial Share Price  Є 40.5 Є 40.0 Є 24.0 
Share price 06/07/2005 (day 
before privatization was 
announced) CAC= 4,180.7 
Є 44.5 Є 41.6 Є 43.6 
Share price 07/18/2005 (day 
when the privatization process 
was launched) CAC= 4,363.5 
Є 51.8 Є 48.4 Є 48.4 
Share price 12/30/2005 
CAC= 4,715.2 
Є 60.4 Є 57.25 Є 50.0 
Remaining State Share 70.2% (via ADF) 75.7% (via ADF) 50.4% (via ADF) 
Ownership Structure 70.2% State & ADF 
0.9% Employees 
0.8% Local authorities 
24.1% Float Shareholders 
4.0% Eiffage Group 
75.7% State & ADF 
0.9% Employees 
0.3% Local authorities 
23.1% Float Shareholders 
50.4% State & ADF 
1.9% Employees 
0.8% Local authorities 
23.9% Float Shareholders 
23.0% Vinci Group 
Workforce 4,391 3,642 7,975 
Gross Revenue 2005 Є 1.57 Billion Є 1.15 Billion Є 2.47 Billion 
EBITDA 2005 Є 0.974 Million Є 0.74 Billion Є 1.57 Billion 
EBITDA/Gross Revenue 62.0% 64.5% 63.4% 
 
Note: CAC stands for the selective index in the Paris Stock Exchange. 
Sources: Journal Officiel de la République Française (Documents Ref. ECOX0609092V, ECOX0609065V, 
ECOX0609151V). Annual Report 2005 APRR, Raport Annuel 2005 SANEF, and Comptes Consolidés 
2005 ASF. 
 
 
Table 4: Financial and Corporate pre-privatization information on Skyway (2004) and 
Indiana Toll Road (2005). 
  
 Chicago Skyway Indiana Toll Road 
Established in 1958 1956 
Network length (miles)  7.8 157 
Ownership Structure 100% City of Chicago 100% State of Indiana 
Workforce 130 590 
Gross Revenues  USD 41.1 million USD 98.6 million 
EBITDA  USD 29 million USD 64 million 
EBITDA/Gross Revenues  70.5% 64.6% 
 
Sources: City of Chicago Financial Reports, Indiana East-West Toll Road Financial Analysis (Crowe Chizek 
and Company LLC, March 7, 2006), and Indiana Toll Road Request for Toll Road Concessionaire  
Proposals. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity of Concession Price to Certain Parameters 
 Base Case 1    Case 2    Case 3     Case 4    Case 5   Case 6 
Concession Term  99 years 23 years 99 years  99 years 99 years 23 years 
Compound Annual Growth in Tolls  3.78% 3.78% 2.08%  3.78% 3.78% 2.08% 
Annual Growth in Traffic 1.23% 1.23% 1.23%  0.23% 1.23% 0.23% 
Annual Growth in Operating Expenses 3.45% 3.45% 3.45%  3.45% 2.20% 3.45% 
        
Discounted Value of Cash Flows (a) $1,881,815 $1,060,359 $1,088,477  $951,773 $1,900,493 $446,281 
Discounted Value as Multiple of   
EBITDA 65x 37x 38x  33x 55x 15x 
 
(a) US$000; discounted at a 9.38%. The discounted value equals the concession price plus 
transaction fees. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   
 
 
 
Table 6. Effect on Chicago Skyway of imposing leverage ratios similar to those imposed by 
French Government (US$ million) 
 Cost of Capital (a) Base Case Case 6a 
Equity  12.30% $661,061 $1,777,393 
Net Debt  8.00% $1,400,000 $283,668 
EBITDA-2006   $40,524 $40,524 
Net Debt divided by EBITDA  35 7 
    
Total Capitalization   $2,061,061 $2,061,061 
Weighted Cost of Capital  9.38% 11.71% 
    
Discounted Value of Cash Flows   $1,881,815 $371,421 
Concession Price as Multiple of EBITDA  (b)  63.1x 12.5x 
    
(a) Represents the imputed cost of equity and debt for Skyway concess ssion.  
(b) Concession price equals the discounted cash flow value minus transaction fees. 
Source: Authors' calculations.    
 
 
 
Table 7. Bidders for the Respective Concessions 
  APRR SANEF   ASF  Skyway Indiana TollRoad 
Eiffage/Macquarie Abertis Vinci  Macquarie/Cintra Macquarie/Cintra 
Abertis Cintra   Vinci, etal Itinere  
Autostrade Eiffage   Abertis 
Babcock & 
Brown/Challenger-
Transfield. 
Cintra Sacyr/Itinere   
Morgan 
Stanley/Autostrade 
  
Note: First row (bold) are the winning bidders. 
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Table 10. Projection of Average Daily Traffic on Skyway 
 
           Wilbur Smith Study (a)    
 Case X (b) Case Y (c) Halcrow Report (d) 
             2004 actual 47,658 47,658 47,658 
2010 64,100 50,300 67,029 
2020 77,600 50,100 101,052 
 
Footnotes: 
(a)(a) From Wilbur Smith traffic report dated April 21, 2004 prepared on behalf of the City 
of Chicago. 
(b) Assumed tolls remain the same (for example $2.00 for cars) over the projection period. 
(c) Assumed tolls increase according to the toll regulation that was included in the 
proposed concession agreement. 
(c) From Halcrow traffic report dated July 2005 prepared on behalf of the winning bidder, 
Skyway Concession Company LLC. 
 
 
Table 11. Summary of Price Drivers    
    Concession Multiple of  
     Price (a)   EBITDA 
Skyway concession-actual  $1,830,000 63.1x      
  Adjusted for shorter concession term-23 years 1,031,388 35.6x     Structural 
  Adjusted for lower allowable tolls-70% of CPI 724,586 25.0x     Structural 
  Adjusted for more modest traffic growth 434,087 15.0x     Procedural 
  Adjusted for less leverage 361,272 12.5x     Structural 
    
Average for French concessions  12.3x  
    
(a) Excludes transaction fees which, for the purpose of this table, are assumed to be a  
    constant 2.7% of the actual and adjusted concession prices.   
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A-1:  Concession Process and Timeline 
 
France US-Chicago Skyway US- Indiana Toll Road 
June 8, 2005: The French prime 
minister announces the sale of the 
State's majority shareholdings in 
ASF, APRR and Sanef.. 
 
July 18, 2005: the French 
Government launches The Toll-
Road Motorway Concessions 
Privatization process. Bidders are 
invited to submit indicative bids. 
 
July 28, 2005: The government 
publishes the draft concession 
agreements which bidders must 
agree to accept. 
 
August 22, 2005: Nineteen 
indicative bids are submitted for the 
three toll roads concessions.  
 
October 2, 2005: The government 
announces the second phase of the 
auction process; bidders are invited 
to submit firm offers by November 
7, based on additional 
specifications.  
 
November 7, 2005: Bids are 
received by the French Government 
for the three toll roads concessions; 
4 bids are offered for APRR, 4 bids 
are offered for Sanef, and 1 bid is 
offered for ASF. 
 
December 1/2, 2005: 
Representatives of the French 
Government meet with the all of the 
bidders individually to review their 
respective bid packages.  
 
December 13, 2005: The French 
Government announces the winning 
bidders for the three toll roads 
concessions. 
March 2, 2004: City issues Request 
for Concessionaire Qualifications. 
 
May 5, 2004: City announces that 
five bidding groups are qualified to 
bid. 
 
May 27, 2004: An invitation to bid is 
provided to each qualified bidder 
along with a draft concession 
agreement and detailed information 
about the Skyway. 
 
July 8, 2004: Prospective bidders 
provide comments on the draft 
concession agreement. 
 
September, 2004: Prospective 
bidders are provided with the bid 
form and a final concession 
agreement. 
 
October 14, 2004: Bids from three 
bidders are received by the City. 
 
October 15, 2004: The City 
announces the winning bidder. 
September 28, 2005: State of 
Indiana issues Request for Toll 
Road Concessionaire Proposals 
(Qualifications). 
 
October 26, 2005: State receives 
proposals. . 
 
October 2005: State selects 
qualified bidders and issues 
invitation to bid. 
 
November/December 2005: 
Prospective bidders are provided 
with detailed information about 
the Toll Road, the concession 
agreement and the bid form. 
 
January 20, 2006 (Friday): Bids 
from three bidding groups are 
received by the State. 
 
January 23, 2006 (Monday): The 
State announces the winning 
bidder. 
 
Note: The three French concessions were auctioned separately, but at the same time. The process and timeline 
used is outlined below. 
Source: Authors.  
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Table A-2. Recent history of CPI and change in nominal GDP/capita in the US 
 
 
  Chg. In Greater of
Year US CPI GDP/cap. CPI & GDP
1 1995 2.50% 3.36% 3.36%
2 1996 3.30% 4.45% 4.45%
3 1997 1.70% 4.97% 4.97%
4 1998 1.60% 4.11% 4.11%
5 1999 2.70% 4.75% 4.75%
6 2000 3.40% 4.74% 4.74%
7 2001 1.60% 2.12% 2.12%
8 2002 2.40% 2.35% 2.40%
9 2003 1.90% 3.77% 3.77%
10 2004 3.30% 5.91% 5.91%
10 yr. Avg. 2.44% 4.05% 4.06%
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Graph 1. CPI in US and Euro area. 
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Graph 2: Actual toll increase versus CPI toll increase. Sanef, small vehicles  
(cents of Euro per kilometer) 
Actual toll increase versus CPI toll increase. Sanef, small vehicles
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Graph 3: Actual toll increase versus CPI toll increase. SAPN, small vehicles  
(cents of Euro per kilometer) 
 
Actual toll increase versus CPI toll increase. SAPN, small vehicles
0.070
0.075
0.080
0.085
0.090
0.095
0.100
0.105
0.110
0.115
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
Actual toll CPI toll
 
33
XREAP2007-11 
 
 
Graph 4: Actual toll increase versus CPI toll increase in Chicago Skyway  
(total toll US$) 
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Graph 5: Actual toll increase versus CPI toll increase in Indiana Toll Road  
(cents US$ per mile) 
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Graph 6. Actual toll increase versus CPI toll increase in Chicago Skyway (total toll US$). 
Total length of concession. 
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